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The Foundations of the Jurisprudence of Chief
Justice Ralph J. Cappy: Reflections of Three Law
Clerks
Jeffrey P. Bauman, Leslie Kozler, & Joy G. McNally*
The foundations of a judge's jurisprudence include many factors-the law, the times, and the views and experiences the judge
brings to the bench. An in-depth analysis of Chief Justice Ralph
J. Cappy's jurisprudence is far beyond the scope of this tribute,
and other contributors have engaged in a more detailed review of
discrete decisions he penned. Those who clerked for Chief Justice
Cappy, however, have the benefit of a unique insight into the
foundations that underlay his jurisprudence. From this point of
view, and upon reflection, it is evident that several factors played
a primary role in the formulation of Chief Justice Cappy's legal
legacy: a deep and abiding respect for the rule of law; an insistence that the law evolve to meet the needs of the community; a
dedication to the fair and efficient administration of justice; and a
profound humility, best reflected in a heartfelt concern for the difficulties facing the common citizen.
The rule of law, and all that it means, stood foremost in Chief
Justice Cappy's approach to decision-making. In his mind, stability in the law was an essential component in upholding the rule of
law. He believed it critical to provide individuals with the comfort
of knowing that the law was not going to change radically or arbitrarily. He also believed that the rule of law was dependent upon
an independent judiciary that enforced the common law and
statutory law and guaranteed the rights and liberties provided by
the state and federal constitutions consistently. In a 2003 speech
at St. Francis University, Chief Justice Cappy remarked:
[T]he rule of law acts as a guiding hand with respect to conduct by demanding the application of existing substantive legal standards in resolving disputes. Whether in constitutional, statutory, or decisional form, the requirement of application of these established legal principles not only prevents
ad hoc rulings, but also offers some modicum of predictability
*
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in decision-making. Thus, people can gauge their future conduct and possibly avoid disputes altogether.
While the rule of law was a significant concern, Chief Justice
Cappy did not follow earlier rulings reflexively. He viewed the
law not as an immutable force, but rather as a living organism
that, when appropriate, had to change to better serve society. He
sometimes had heated debates with his law clerks over whether to
join another Justice's opinion, or over how a particular issue
should be resolved. As was his custom, he did not make a display
of his keen intellect, preferring instead to argue his point with a
joke or good story. For example, in the face of arguments based
upon long-standing precedent, Chief Justice Cappy would regale
us with one of his favorites.
He would begin with "Remember Pope Leo," which was his way
of expressing his beliefs as to the proper and necessary evolution
of the law. The story he would tell was about an edict that Pope
Leo had issued.' As Chief Justice Cappy told it, Pope Leo declared
that absolute silence was required of the engineers and workers
who were erecting an obelisk in St. Peter's Square, and that infractions of the rule would be punishable by death. A Genovese
sailor who was knowledgeable about ropes and the hoisting of
sails witnessed the work and observed the ropes attached to the
block and tackle used to lift the spire. The ropes were straining
under the weight of the monument. The sailor knew that the solution to avert catastrophe was to douse the ropes to give them
added flexibility; otherwise, the ropes would snap, the Obelisk
would fall, and many workers would be crushed. While knowing
that he would die for breaking Pope Leo's edict, the sailor cried
out, "Water on the ropes!" thereby averting disaster. The grateful
Pope, as the story went, disregarded his own edict and spared the
sailor's life.
Thus, to Chief Justice Cappy, the moral of the story was that
one should not only speak out and say what was necessary, rather
than stay silent, but that one should not blindly follow the law,
when common sense and the betterment of society pointed in a
different direction.
However, Chief Justice Cappy was concerned with not only the
substantive law; he was also mindful that the fair administration
of justice depended on proper procedures. Indeed, he was viewed
1. This story is attributed by some to Pope Sixtus V.
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as particularly gifted in administrative matters. Early in his judicial career as a judge on the Court of Common Pleas, he was given
the Herculean task of remedying the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas Civil Division's backlogged docket. His success in
reorganizing the Civil Division resulted in a system that not only
became one of the most efficient civil court systems in the country,
but one that ensured that justice was administered in an evenhanded and efficient manner. This administrative talent infused
his decision-making and opinion writing. Always, Chief Justice
Cappy would consider the practical impact of the Court's decisions
on attorneys, judges, and litigants. In any opinion he authored, he
would aim not only to answer the immediate question before the
Court, but also to provide the bench and bar with a clear blueprint
for correctly addressing the issue at hand in future cases.
Finally, a driving force behind virtually all of Chief Justice
Cappy's decisions was his humility-he possessed that rare feel
for the common person. Ralph Cappy was not born with a silver
spoon in his mouth. He hailed from Brookline, Pennsylvania, a
gritty, blue-collar area near Pittsburgh. Working every summer,
not at the country club but in the steel mill, (and sometimes, as he
would describe, "defending a point with a baseball bat") would
color his approach to the law in later years. He carried his background with him as he rose to the position of Chief Justice. Indeed, while he embraced the power of his position, he worked to
keep it in perspective. For example, Chief Justice Cappy not only
enjoyed his motorcycle trips across the country but also appreciated them. While he surely wanted time to recharge his drained
batteries, he also recognized that these trips kept him humble and
in touch. He knew that the position of Supreme Court Justice carried with it the potential for becoming too impressed with one's
own importance. Speaking about one of his motorcycle trips to the
western United States, he quipped, "Here [in Pennsylvania as a
Supreme Court Justice] every joke is funny, and every putt is a
gimmie, but out there, I am just another bunyak on a motorcy2
cle."
Chief Justice Cappy's humility led to a deep and passionate caring for the poor and disadvantaged, as reflected in his service as a
public defender. Yet, his empathy for those in need was not lim2. Chief Justice Cappy had his own Brookline-born stock of terms to describe individuals in humorous fashion. Among our favorite Cappyisms were the labels bunyak and
nudnik. A bunyak is an ordinary Joe, a down-to-earth person. A nudnik is a person who
insists on remaining oblivious to the obvious.
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ited to criminal law; his concern for the common person reached to
all areas of the law. As a trial judge, Chief Justice Cappy witnessed the travails and triumphs of ordinary people day-in and
day-out. He did not forget them. In sum, Chief Justice Cappy's
ability to embrace his humble beginnings and his concern for the
common citizen had a significant formative impact on his jurisprudence.
These driving forces are reflected, to one extent or the other, in
Chief Justice Cappy's opinions.
While numerous decisions authored by Chief Justice Cappy
could exemplify his respect for the rule of law, one perhapspedestrian aspect of appellate jurisprudence may best represent
his struggle to uphold and preserve it. Chief Justice Cappy's mentor and former law-school professor, Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert of
the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals, was one of the
first judges to place a fundamental emphasis on the proper standard of review, i.e., the deference that an appellate court accords a
lower tribunal's decision. Like his mentor, the Chief Justice
championed discerning and adhering to the proper standard of
review when resolving an appeal. Nowhere was this more of an
ongoing struggle during his tenure than in the arena of labor relations.
Soon after certain public employees of the Commonwealth were
permitted to organize for purposes of collective bargaining through
the 1970 Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act, the issue arose
regarding the proper deference to be paid by the judiciary when
reviewing a grievance arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in the 1970s adopted the federal approach of embracing a very deferential standard of review, which came to be
known as the "essence test." The inquiry that informed this test
was whether the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. If the arbitrator's award could in
any rational way be derived from the agreement between the parties, then the reviewing court was required to affirm the award.
In the mid-1980s, however, a series of decisions by the Pennsylvania high court eroded this deferential standard and embraced
one that focused on the reasonableness of the grievance award.
This less-deferential standard of review resulted in an increased
number of arbitration awards being reversed by the judiciary. As
this, in turn, frustrated the policies that undergird arbitration,
namely, speed, lack of expense, and finality, and undermined the
stability of the rule of law, Chief Justice Cappy attempted to direct the Court back to the previously settled deferential standard.
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Persevering for almost a decade, Chief Justice Cappy struggled
to reaffirm the essence test as the rule of law and to preserve it as
the proper standard of review in this area. In his 1999 decision in
State System of Higher Education v. State College and University
ProfessionalAss'n, 3 he made clear that the essence test was the
proper analysis by which to consider an appeal of a labor arbitration award. The integrity of the test was challenged in subsequent years, with the Court staggering between a vibrant application of the essence test and a watered-down version expressed as
the "core-functions" exception that threatened to swallow the rule.
Ultimately, as his tenure on the Court came to an end, Chief Justice Cappy's 2007 majority opinion in Westmoreland Intermediate
Unit #7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Ass'n 4 steered the Court's
view of the proper standard of review back to the original essence
test. His insistence on reaffirming the essence test as the proper
standard of review for considering an appeal of a grievance arbitration award not only supported the policies underlying labor
arbitration but, more importantly, represented his strong commitment to upholding the rule of law.
There is no case more emblematic of Chief Justice Cappy's willingness to depart from precedent in the interest of justice than his
opinion in Commonwealth v. Grant.5 In Grant, the absolute requirement set down in Commonwealth v. Hubbard6 that a claim of
trial counsel's ineffectiveness must be raised at the time a defendant had new counsel or be deemed waived, was overruled, and a
new rule-that a defendant should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until petitioning for collateral review-was announced. For Chief Justice Cappy, this result was
most gratifying. As a former public defender who represented the
criminally accused, and as a former trial judge who sentenced the
convicted, he viewed the change he had championed as critical to
protecting the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective representation. The change had the added benefit of streamlining the collateral review process by clarifying that claims of trial-counsel
ineffectiveness could be raised in a first petition for postconviction relief, even when the petitioner had new counsel on direct appeal.
3.
4.
5.
6.

743 A.2d
939 A.2d
813 A.2d
372 A.2d

405
855
726
687

(Pa. 1999).
(Pa. 2007).
(Pa. 2002).
(Pa. 1977).
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In the analysis, Chief Justice Cappy first showed how the Hubbard rule required the Pennsylvania appellate courts to perform
functions for which they were not particularly well-suitedentertaining issues raised for the first time on appeal, engaging in
fact-finding, or considering matters outside the trial-court record.
He then discussed and found meritorious the varying rationales
espoused by the many jurisdictions that had postponed review of
ineffectiveness claims to collateral proceedings. Moving to Pennsylvania's then-existing system, Chief Justice Cappy demonstrated the almost-insurmountable burdens that an insufficiently
developed record and a 30-day appeal period placed upon appellate counsel in the presentation of ineffectiveness claims. For example, under the Hubbardrule, counsel was required not only to
raise any trial errors but also to consider extra-record claims that
were implicated by counsel ineffectiveness, all within the 30-day
appeal period. Based on this time pressure, Chief Justice Cappy
concluded that the Hubbard rule was thwarting the fair adjudication of ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Accordingly, he overruled
Hubbard and deferred review of trial-counsel ineffectiveness
claims until the collateral review stage of criminal proceedings.
Such a postponement of these claims had the added benefit of
streamlining first petitions for post-conviction review, which also
served Chief Justice Cappy's interest in administrative efficiency.
Under the framework set forth in Hubbard, a post-conviction petitioner who obtained new counsel for purposes of direct appeal was
required to present collateral claims in terms of appellate-counsel
ineffectiveness. This argument was necessary because claims of
trial-counsel ineffectiveness that were not raised on direct appeal
were waived. In other words, the petitioner would have to establish that his or her appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a claim of trial-counsel ineffectiveness. Post-Grant, a petitioner would no longer have to "layer" his claims in this manner,
as he or she would no longer be required to raise trial-counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal.
As illustrated in his decision in Grant, while Chief Justice
Cappy recognized the promise that a change in the law could
bring, his zeal was always tempered by concern for the fair and
efficient administration of justice. Chief Justice Cappy's pragmatic approach to the evolving law is evident in J.S. v. Bethlehem
Area School District,7 a case on the complex issue of student
7.

807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
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speech. In J.S., the Court was faced with the thorny question of
whether a school could discipline a student for showing his Web
site, which contained disparaging comments about a teacher and
the school principal, to another student at school. Ultimately, the
teacher who was the focus of the Web site became so emotionally
distraught that she had to take leave from her employment. Recognizing that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," Chief
Justice Cappy crafted an approach to dealing with this increasingly frequent problem that balanced the student's right of free
speech with the school's right to impose discipline and perform its
mission. The result was classic Chief Justice Cappy.
Emphasizing the constitutional rights of children, the role of the
school authorities acting in loco parentis to protect children, and
the need to establish order and discipline, Chief Justice Cappy
first looked to the patchwork of existing law on the subject and
acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's failure to visit
the area in years. In attempting to fill the void created by this
dearth of decisional law, Chief Justice Cappy characteristically
struck a balanced approach to the issue. He set forth a framework
in which the location of the speech, the form of the speech, the effect of the speech, the setting in which the speech was communicated, and finally, whether the speech was part of a schoolsponsored activity were considered. Ultimately, in reconciling the
competing policies at play and attempting to come to a fair result,
Chief Justice Cappy, writing for the majority, determined that the
lewd, "on-campus" speech, which was aimed at specific school personnel, accessed by the student in school, and disrupted the school
environment, allowed for school disciplinary action.
An example of Chief Justice Cappy's abiding respect for the
work of lawyers and judges in the courtroom and his desire to create templates in his opinions that would guide them in the law's
8
proper application is Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc.
In Grady, the plaintiffs claimed that Mr. Grady sustained a lifethreatening esophageal tear as a result of eating Doritos corn
chips. The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer, alleging that the
8. 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003). Grady generated an unusual token of appreciation and
one that Chief Justice Cappy shared with his law clerks. Following Grady's publication, he
received a coffee cup from Common Good, a coalition that believes that basic, common
sense is too often missing from our nation's courtrooms. Although Chief Justice Cappy did
not disclose what he thought of Common Good's perspective, he was certainly pleased that
the coffee cup could be taken as an indication that his majority opinion in Grady was clear,
sensible, and pragmatic.

624

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

chips were dangerous and defective. To prove their case, plaintiffs
offered the report of an expert who measured the compressive
strength of Doritos and concluded that, because of their hardness
and strength, the chips were capable of perforating the esophagus
while being swallowed. The manufacturer asserted that the expert's testimony did not satisfy the rule articulated in Frye v.
United States9 and adopted in Pennsylvania, which provides that
novel scientific evidence is admissible if the methodology that underlies the evidence has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. The trial court agreed with the manufacturer on
Frye; the Superior Court did not. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to review the Superior Court's ruling and to consider
whether the Frye test should give way to the standard in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.0
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Cappy reversed. On the
overarching question as to whether Frye should be replaced with
Daubert, he reaffirmed Pennsylvania's commitment to Frye, noting that because Frye's general-acceptance test was a proven and
workable rule, there was no need for change. Turning to Frye's
proper application, he provided instruction on several critical Frye
issues, clarifying that the proponent of the evidence bears the
burden of proof; that Frye requires that methodology, not conclusions, be generally accepted; that Frye was only one component of
admissibility; and that the standard of appellate review was for an
abuse of discretion. Next, Chief Justice Cappy determined that
the Superior Court did indeed err in substituting its judgment for
that of the trial court. Finally, rather than remand for reconsideration, he reviewed the trial court's decision and upheld it. In
typical straightforward fashion, he zeroed in on the problem with
the expert's conclusion, explaining that the expert's calculations,
although shown to be a standard scientific method for assessing
the downward force needed to break an object, were not shown to
be a generally accepted method for reaching conclusions about
food safety. Accordingly, Chief Justice Cappy held that the trial
court acted within its discretion in finding the expert's testimony
inadmissible under Frye.
Finally, Chief Justice Cappy's concern for the consequences of a
decision on the lives of ordinary people is evident in Ieropoli v.
AC&S Corp.11 In this appeal, the Court was faced with deciding
9.
10.
11.

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
842 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004).
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whether a statutory enactment that relieved successor corporations of all liability for the accrued causes of action of individuals
who had been exposed to asbestos products violated Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Article 1, Section 11, otherwise known as the "open courts" or
"remedies" clause, has its origins in English law. Thus, Chief Justice Cappy began with the Magna Carta and traced its guarantee
of a legal remedy for injuries into Pennsylvania's own constitution
and decisional law. He then showed that, according to longstanding Pennsylvania jurisprudence, an accrued cause of action
is a vested right that the remedies clause protects from extinguishment by legislation. Next, following the dictates of the
Statutory Construction Act, he determined that the statute operated to relieve successor corporations of all responsibility for any
asbestos-related cause of action, including those that had accrued.
After demonstrating that a cause of action is a remedy in the eyes
of the law, i.e., the vehicle by which one seeks legal redress for the
injuries he or she has suffered, Chief Justice Cappy concluded that
the statute as applied in the instant case was unconstitutional. In
other words, by extinguishing accrued asbestos-related causes of
action, the General Assembly's enactment denied the individuals
who held them a vested right in the remedy guaranteed by Article
1, Section 11.
Accordingly, through the use of constitutional, statutory, and
decisional law, Chief Justice Cappy was able to forge a majority
opinion that set forth the parameters of an acceptable statutory
response to the challenge of asbestos litigation. While Chief Justice Cappy was deeply concerned with the heavy toll that such
litigation was visiting upon Pennsylvania corporations, he made
clear that any statute aimed at alleviating that burden could not
offend the protections given to the injured under the remedies
clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
These opinions are but a few examples of the driving forces that
informed Chief Justice Cappy's jurisprudence. Certainly, his opinions reflect a regard for the rule of law, a concern for the evolution
of the law, a dedication to the fair and efficient administration of
justice, and an appreciation for the ramifications of the law on the
common person. They are his legacy as a jurist. For those of us
who worked with him, however, these attributes were always on
view. They were evident in not only his decision-making but also
in the way he ran his chambers, in the way he led the Court, and
in the way he resolved the many issues that he confronted as a
public servant. It is abundantly clear that all of us-the judges,
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attorneys, and citizens of Pennsylvania-will enjoy the lasting
benefits of Chief Justice Cappy's work and the unique set of attributes he brought to the bench.

